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I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of law and technology has led to substantial activity in
the field of communications law. The growth in popularity and use of the
Internet has made it an area of economic, technological, and social interest.
This has brought it to the attention and regulatory interest of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).' The Internet, however, poses
problems for the traditional regulatory paradigms that the FCC has come to2
rely upon. This is true not only for the Internet itself, but also for the areas
of intersection between the Internet and "traditional" media, such as
telecommunications and cable. With the pending merger of TCI and AT&T
and their promise of "one-stop" television, Internet, and telephone service,
the cable Internet issues move to the forefront. The FCC and Congress
responded by trying to induce increased competition in communications
fields.3 The desire of traditional Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to gain
access to new high-speed technologies for Internet access led to requests
for unbundling or open access to cable systems.4 Such requirements would
allow ISPs to lease elements of the cable company's infrastructure to
compete with the cable company's own ISP.
Despite the focus of most of the attention and advocacy toward the
1. See, e.g., Fact Sheet (visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureausl
CommonCarrier/Factsheets/nominute.html> (discussing FCC's consideration of whether
calls to ISPs are local or long-distance); FCC Access Charge Reform Homepage (last
modified July 16, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/isp.html> (providing a home page for access
charge reform and the implications for information service providers); Kevin Werbach,
Digital Tornado: The Internet and Telecommunications Policy (visited Oct. 10, 1999)
<http://www.fcc.govlBureauslWireless/OPP/working-papers/oppwp29.txt> (discussing
office plans and policy analysis of the Internet, focusing on problems with current
definitions, pricing structures, and bandwidth availability).
2. See Werbach, supra note 1.
3. See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from Tele-communications, Inc. to AT&T Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, paras. 77-81, 92-96, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 29 (1999)
[hereinafter FCC License Transfer].
4. See id. at para. 75; FCC Likely to Punt on Web Unbundling, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
Jan. 25, 1999, at 5.
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federal level, local authorities took the first regulatory step toward open
cable Internet access. Portland, Oregon, and surrounding Multnomah
County were chosen for early access to the television-Internet-telephone
service package to be offered by the merged AT&T and TCI . To
implement this marketing strategy, TCI needed local approval to transfer
its existing cable franchises to AT&T. In an effort to meet community
needs, however, the local authorities in Portland and Multnomah County
conditioned such a transfer on the provision of open access to the "cable
modem platform." Unable to reach a compromise with the local
governmental bodies, AT&T and TCI filed suit in district court in an
attempt to overturn the imposition of the open access requirement. In
6AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, the district court held that the actions of
the local authorities were justified under existing law.7 AT&T and TCI• . 8
appealed this holding to the Ninth Circuit, ensuring that the issue of
unbundling of cable Internet access remains in the spotlight in the near
future. More directly, however, the lawsuit attempts to settle the question
of the legitimate role of local regulators regarding cable Internet access.
This Comment begins by looking at the technologies that exist for
providing Internet access. This includes traditional "dial-up" access using a
modem and local phone lines, as well as a variety of technologies to allow
high-speed access. The facts surrounding the imposition by Portland and
Multnomah of an open access requirement on AT&T and TCI will be
considered next. Finally, the merits of open access will be considered, as
well as the authority of local regulatory bodies to impose such a
requirement.
II. TECHNOLOGY
Before addressing the specific justifications for unbundling or open
access to the cable Internet platform, it is useful to have a basic
understanding of the technologies for Internet access. This will begin with
a brief consideration of the current narrowband modem over telephone line
method. Next, technologies for high-speed access other than cable will be
considered. Finally, the technology of cable Internet access, as well as the
5. For discussion of the facts of this case, see infra Part III.
6. Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138 (D. Or. June 3, 1999).
7. See id.
8. See AT&T Seeks Expedited Appeal of Portland Cable Ruling (visited Oct. 10, 1999)
<http://www.att.com/press/item/0,1 193,520,00.html>. The FCC filed an amicus brief with
the Ninth Circuit in this appeal, arguing against the authority of local regulators to act in this
manner. See FCC Court Brief Underscores Consumer Benefits from National Internet
Policy of Unregulation; Urges Narrow Judicial Resolution (visited Oct. 10, 1999)
<http:llwww.fcc.gov/BureauslMiscellaneous/News_Releasesl1999nrmc9O6O.html>.
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two major cable ISPs, will be discussed.
A. Current "Dial-Up" Access
Currently, the most common method of Internet access among private
individuals is the combination of a modem over the regular, twisted-pair
telephone line used for telephone access. Users dial up an ISP, which
provides the user with a connection to the Internet. Data can be sent and
received from the Internet, given the capability of modems currently
available, at speeds of up to fifty-six kilobytes per second (Kbps). Factors
such as the capabilities of the site the user is visiting or the amount of
traffic on the Internet at the moment, however, can make actual data speeds
much slower than the theoretical maximum. To download a fifteen
megabytes file at fifty-six kilobytes per second would take about thirty-
eight minutes.9 The current price for Internet access by this method is in the
area of twenty dollars per month.
B. High-Speed Alternative Technologies
One technology that allows higher speed Internet access is the
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN). The maximum potential
speed of the most common type of ISDN connection is up to 512 Kbps. l0
To download a fifteen megabytes file at 512 Kbps would take about four
minutes. It costs between one hundred dollars to four hundred dollars to
have an ISDN line installed. The user must also provide an ISDN router to
connect to the Internet. Finally, for the most common level of service, the
cost is around sixty-seven dollars per month.'
The Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) also allows high-speed Internet
access. Although there are many variations of this technology, the most
common is the asymmetric DSL (ADSL). With a "splitter" version of
ADSL, it is possible to use the line for both voice and data simultaneously.
This would eliminate the need for a second phone line for Internet access.
ADSL works over the regular lines used for phone service, but utilizes a
special connection that provides much faster data transfer speeds. Users
need to purchase a special type of modem that facilitates this connection,
which will cost about $200. Additionally, the user's phone company must
act as their ISP. The current cost for this service is about $40 per month for
data speeds of 256 Kbps, up to $125 per month for one megabit per second
9. See Phil J. Shuey, High-Speed Internet Connections: What You Need to Know, 27
COLO. LAW. 9, 12 (1998).
10. See id. at 14.
11. See id.
[Vol. 52
CABLE INTERNET UNBUNDLING
or $875 per month for seven megabytes per second (Mbps) 12 To download
a fifteen megabytes file at one megabytes per second would take about two
minutes.
Yet another option for high-speed Internet access is a T1 high-speed
leased telephone line, which provides point-to-point service (PTP). A T1
connection allows data transfer at up to 1.5 Mbps.13 To download a fifteen
megabytes file at 1.5 Mbps would take a little over one minute. The cost
for this technology is commonly about $330 per month, plus forty-four
dollars per mile from the user's computer to the ISP.
14
Wireless Internet access is being developed as an alternative
technology. One account suggests that Internet access through low-earth
orbit satellites will be able to attain data speeds roughly two thousand times
faster than traditional modems. This would yield data speeds of about one
hundred megabytes per second. At this transfer speed, a file of fifteen
megabytes would download in less than one second. At the present time,
however, this technology is primarily in the developmental stage.
C. Cable Technology
Cable or "broadband" Internet access also allows substantially greater
data speeds than traditional phone networks. For true high-speed Internet
access, new broadband cable must be installed to allow both reception and
transmission of data. Theoretically, cable Internet access can allow data
rates of up to ten megabytes per second.16 Other estimates, however, put the
likely data transmission range from two to five megabytes per second.1 7 At
five megabytes per second, it would take about twenty-four seconds to
download a fifteen megabyte file. The monthly cost for this service is
about forty dollars. A special cable modem is also required to allow access.
Further, most currently installed cable connections only allow reception of
data (i.e., for data to be transmitted to the subscriber's television) and thus
must be replaced to allow full high-speed access.
An alternative cable approach would utilize existing cable to provide
practical high-speed Internet access. Customers could use existing one-way
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See En Banc Hearing on Bandwidth Before the Federal Communications
Commission at 3-4 (visited Aug. 25, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/enbanc/O70998/teledesi.
pdf> (testimony of Steve Hooper, Co-Chief Executive Officer, Teledesic).
16. See Shuey, supra note 9, at 14.
17. See En Banc Hearing on Bandwidth Before the Federal Communications
Commission, supra note 15 (written statement of Milo Medin, Senior Vice President,
Engineering and Chief Technology Officer, @Home Network).
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cable to receive data at high speeds. The transmission of data to the
Internet by the subscriber would be accomplished through use of the
telephone lines at slower speeds.18
The two main ISPs providing access over cable lines are @Home and
Road Runner. @Home has affiliate agreements with leading cable
companies, such as TCI, Comcast, Cox, InterMedia Partners, Marcus
Cable, Rogers, Shaw, and Cablevision Systems Corp.' 9 The combined
cable networks of @Home's partners reach roughly forty percent of U.S.
households. Time Warner and Cablevision use Road Runner. Reports
indicate that Road Runner will combine its service with MediaOne's
MediaOne Express, which will change its service name to Road Runner. 0
III. AT&T CORP. V. CITY OF PORTLAND
Portland, Oregon, was chosen as a market to test a new marketing
agreement from AT&T and TCI to provide a package of local and long-
distance phone, cable TV, and Internet services on an upgraded cable
network.2' To do this, TCI was required to transfer the ownership of its
cable franchise agreements to AT&T, which will run the company. The Mt.
Hood Cable Regulatory Commission (MHCRC) decided that competing
ISPs should be able to use the AT&T and TCI network to provide Internet
service.22 "Portland and Multnomah County, following the cable
commission's recommendation," voted "to impose the open access
condition as part of their approval of the franchise transfer."23 AT&T
claimed that America Online (AOL) and U.S. West, who requested
unbundling at the federal level, pushed their agendas on the local
authorities, leading to the unbundling requirement.24 Oregon lawmakers,
however, may have been more interested in "smooth[ing] the way for those
local ISPs to offer Internet access that addresses specific community
needs."25
18. See Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past at
77 (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/
oppwp30.pdf>.
19. See id. at 79 n.373.
20. See id. at 78.
21. See Su-Jin Yim, AT&T, TCI Sue Local Regulators, Portland, Multnomah County,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 20, 1999, at Al.
22. See id.
23. Id.; see also AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
138, 139 (D. Or. June 3, 1999) (quoting identical provisions in Portland, Or., Ordinance
172955 (Dec. 17, 1998) and Mutlnomah County Bd. of Comm'rs, Or., Resolution 98-208
(Dec. 17, 1998)).
24. See Yim, supra note 21, at A21.
25. Price Colman, Unbundling Duel in Denver, BRDCST. & CABLE, Jan. 11, 1999, at 67.
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The first lawsuit in the debate over open cable Internet access arose
when AT&T and TCI filed suit in Oregon District Court in an attempt to
overturn the unbundling requirement.26 The issues involved in this dispute
are "whether local authorities can preside over far-reaching industry issues
and what equals fair competition in the fast-moving technology age."27 In a
broader sense, however, this dispute raises the question of whether
unbundling or open access requirements should be placed on cable
companies wishing to offer Internet access services. Portland City
Commissioner, Erik Sten, explained that, from the city's perspective, "'we
can't give away local power' .. . . 'We have enough cases in which local
governments are really left in the lurch by federal policy. The fact that
AT&T is suing us is not nearly reason enough to back down."'
2
The Oregon District Court resolved the case by granting the city of
Portland and Multnomah County's motion to dismiss.29 AT&T and TCI
also moved for summary judgment, and the court found that there were no
disputed issues of material fact. Thus, "these summary judgment motions.
. resolve the issues." The court addressed numerous arguments based on
the Constitution and federal law, however, the court ultimately concluded
that these arguments did not prevail and granted summary judgment in
31• 32favor of the defendants." AT&T and TCI appealed this decision, and the
FCC has intervened as well.33
Several issues are raised both directly and indirectly by this litigation.
Although the suit is not challenging the merits of unbundling itself and the
district court did not expressly address it,34 the issue is clearly at the heart
of AT&T and TCI's motives for filing the suit. Second, and more directly
relevant to the suit, there is the question of whether this was an appropriate
means of implementing an open access requirement. Specifically, there is a
question of whether the cable unbundling issue should be dealt with solely
on the federal level, or whether this type of regulation can be implemented
using the local authority over franchise agreements.
26. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138 (D. Or.
June 3, 1999); Yim, supra note 21, at Al.
27. Id.; See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138,
138-40.
28. Yirn, supra note 21, at Al.
29. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138, 143.
30. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138, 140.
31. See id. at 143.
32. See AT&T Seeks Expedited Appeal of Portland Cable Ruling, supra note 8.
33. See FCC Court Brief Underscores Consumer Benefits from National Internet
Policiy of Unregulation; Urges Narrow Judicial Resolution, supra note 8.
34. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138.
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IV. OPEN ACCESS
The general issues associated with unbundling of cable Internet
access have received substantial attention at both the federal and local
levels. A preliminary question is whether Internet access is a cable service
or telecommunications service. Second, numerous arguments in support of
access to broadband for competing ISPs are raised. Finally, potential
regulatory remedies are proposed and evaluated under the First
Amendment.
A. Cable Service vs. Telecommunications Service
A preliminary issue is whether AT&T and TCI should be treated as a
telecommunications service provider and thus fall within the unbundling
and other requirements already applied in the telecommunications context.
Many ISPs and telecommunications providers argue that AT&T and TCI
should be treated as a telecommunications service provider.35 AT&T and
TCI, as well as the National Cable Television Association (NCTA), argued
that services such as those provided by @Home are "cable services.
AT&T and TCI argued that the legislative history of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 37 indicates that the addition of the words
"or use" (as opposed to the more passive "interaction") to the definition of
cable service was meant to include the type of interactive services provided
by @Home.38 The NCTA has acknowledged that such an interpretation
would subject the services to cable franchise fees. 39 However, this would
also "bring[] cable Internet-based services under the cable framework" and
35. See, e.g., FCC License Transfer, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R.
3160, para. 83, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 29 (1999).
36. See id. at para. 82 (arguments of AT&TiTCI). See also Esbin, supra note 18, at 93
(argument of NCTA). For the statutory definition of "cable services", see 47 U.S.C. §
522(6) (Supp. II 1996).
37. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
38. See FCC License Transfer, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160,
para. 82, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 29. Statements by Representative Dingell immediately
prior to passage of the 1996 Act support this interpretation. Representative Dingell,
discussing the effect of the revised definition of cable services would have on franchise
revenues, stated:
This conference agreement strengthens the ability of local government to collect
fees for the use of public rights-of-way. For example, the definition of the term
"cable service" has been expanded to include game channels and other interactive
services. This will result in additional revenues flowing to the cities in the form of
franchise fees.
141 CONG. REc. H1156 (1996) (statement of Rep. Dingell). "Other interactive services"
may have been a reference to Internet access services. See Esbin, supra note 18, at 85.
39. See Esbin, supra note 18, at 93.
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"provide the industry desired regulatory stability at the most fundamental
level."40 It would also exempt them from regulations placed upon
information and/or enhanced services which would fall upon Internet
services provided by telecommunications carriers over telecommunications
facilities.4 1 It has been argued that in the case of "Internet-based services, in
which the cable operator supplies significant amounts of its own content
and local programming and information along with open-ended Internet
connectivity, inclusion under the definition of cable services is relatively
easy because, such Internet-based services share many of the features of
traditional cable programming services." 42 A strong argument can be made
in support of the categorization of @Home-type cable Internet access as a
cable service. Thus far, the FCC seems unpersuaded by arguments to the
contrary. Such a holding will also work to bring this service under greater
local regulatory control through franchise requirements. Thus, this
Comment will proceed from the assumption that cable Internet access, at
least of the type provided by @Home, is a cable service.
B. Access to Broadband Technology
Numerous arguments have been raised in support of open access to
cable Internet technology. These arguments include support of competition
and increased consumer choice of content. Several additional arguments
from familiar cable regulations, including analogies to existing must-carry
and leased access requirements, may justify open access as well. Several
alternatives exist for dealing with the policy concerns that are raised. First
Amendment concerns, however, may limit the alternatives that are
available at this time.
1. Lack of Competition from the General ISP Market
Although there are currently narrowband "competitor" ISPs in most,
if not all, markets in which cable Internet access will be made available,
they may not in fact provide competition. Broadband service provides both
substantially better transmission quality and data speeds than available
from dial-up access. In addition to the desirability of these traits in their
own right, they could also allow for the provision of new services. AT&T
and TCI argued that, once the greater expense associated with broadband is
accounted for, the cheaper narrowband alternative does provide effective
competition.4 ' Evidence was presented to the FCC, however, indicating
40. Id. at4.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 87.
43. See FCC License Transfer, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160,
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that-accounting for both quality and price-narrowband Internet access is
not a substitute for broadband service. 44 Thus, the general category of
Internet access services may be too broad a category for purposes of
measuring competition.
The FCC's regulatory decision-declining to act at the present
time-relied upon the potential competition in the form of other high-speed
access technologies. The FCC stated that "the record, while sparse,
suggests that multiple methods of increasing bandwidth are or soon will be
made available to a broad range of customers. On this basis, we see no
reason to take action on this issue at this time.
' 45
Although this ostensibly involves inaction on the part of the FCC, its
faith in customer use of multiple technologies-one for cable television,
another for Internet access-resembles a regulatory mistake of the past.
Rather than rely on must-carry requirements, the FCC had previously
hoped that cable and broadcasting coexistence would be ensured by the
inclusion of an A/B switch that allowed individuals to switch between
cable programming and broadcast programming received by their antenna.
46Prior to passing the 1992 Cable Act, the House of Representatives found
that "[a] recent survey of cable subscribers shows that consumers are not
willing to use A/B switches .... Consumers appear to be unwilling to bear
the expense of subscribing to cable and of maintaining an adequate antenna
for off-the-air reception . . . ,,4' The Senate reported that among other
problems with the A/B switches, "[ninety-eight] percent of cable homes do
not have rooftop antennas connected to their television sets., 48 Indeed, "the
FCC noted [that] the cable industry encouraged its subscribers to take
down their antennas and eliminate their capacity to receive signal off-air.,
4 9
The effects of these facts were, that:
Once a home is connected to cable ... that home becomes
extremely dependent upon that cable for reception of local
para. 77, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 29.
44. See id. at para. 78 (noting that this argument was raised by numerous parties and
was supported by AOL with an economic model and expert testimony).
45. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Report, 14 F.C.C.R.
2398, para. 101, 14 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1292 (1999) [hereinafter Deployment of Advanced
Telecomms.]; accord FCC License Transfer, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R.
3160, para. 62, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 29.
46. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
47. H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 54 (1992).
48. S. REP. No. 102-92, at 45 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1178.
49. Id.
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television stations. Even though these signals theoretically are
available over-the-air, when a local television station is not
carried on a cable system, cable subscribers effectively lose their
ability to watch it. The cable becomes a gate over which the local
system has control .5
Just as the FCC's faith in the A/B switch and consumer maintenance
of a TV antenna proved misguided, faith in competing hardware solutions
may be misguided as well. The same consumers who were unwilling to
keep or obtain a TV antenna in the face of readily available cable television
service are unlikely to undertake the effort necessary to have new
technologies wired into their home for the purpose of Internet access, when
comparable service is available through their existing cable connection.
Further, continued use of existing twisted-pair telephone wiring may
decline, given the availability of telephone service over the same cable
used for television and Internet service. This could be particularly
problematic for local ISPs who may not have the finances to implement
new high-speed technologies themselves, but would have to wait to buy
access from large ISPs. Thus, the absence of any competing Internet access
technologies from any home with cable service is an outcome that is both
likely and detrimental to the consumer.
2. Lack of Competition Within the Cable Market
It appears that prime justification for the regulatory action of the city
of Portland and of Multnomah County stemmed from the conclusion that
"@Home had no viable competitors in the local retail market for residential
Internet access services., 51 Further, a number of arguments have been made
to the FCC raising the concern that, without open access or unbundling,
AT&T and TCI (and in the future, similarly situated cable companies)
would have such a head start in broadband access that they would obtain
monopoly, or near-monopoly status. Indeed, the FCC noted that "cable
systems typically contract with only one cable modem service provider,
and that provider actually manages data delivery over the cable facilities. '52
Therefore, "it does not appear that other cable modem service providers
such as Road Runner, formed by Time Warner, are likely to be participants
50. Id. at 42, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1175.
51. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138, 139 (D. Or.
June 3, 1999). The Mt. Hood Cable Regulatory Commission, which advises Portland and
Multnomah County, found that the cable modem platform was "an 'essential facility' ...
meaning a facility that competitors cannot practically duplicate and that is otherwise
unavailable." Id.
52. FCC License Transfer, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, para.
73, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 29 (1999).
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in markets served by @Home" so that "[c]ompetition, where it takes place,
is for the contract to supply the customer's cable system."53 Substantial
development of broadband access by a given cable company will also
result in no net competition in a given consumer's market.
Considering all these factors, cable companies, like AT&T and TCI,
will have the ability to discriminate against competing ISPs and deny
interconnection in order to seek monopoly profits. The rapid deployment of
broadband technology, coupled with the attractive package that can be
offered by AT&T and TCI, will give it substantial control over the price of
access. 54 By offering high-speed Internet access as part of a package with
services already utilized by customers, such as TCI cable television and
AT&T telecommunications service, it is substantially less likely that a
customer will look elsewhere for Internet access. In a filing with the FCC,
the Mount Hood Cable Regulatory Commission (MHCRC) argued
precisely this point. The MHCRC stated that the "proprietary platforms"
offered by @Home and similar cable services may not "become available
universally and in all markets and franchise areas unless local governments
retain and utilize the regulatory tools available under existing franchise
agreements and federally-recognized consumer protection authority." 5
This is a particular danger due to the "general availability of cable
connections in urban areas, and the potentially superior technical 'fit' for
many households to the robust cable platform as compared with the more
limited DSL and other options available on the narrowband telephone
platform."56
53. Id.
54. See id. at para. 81.
55. Mt. Hood Cable Regulatory Commission, Ex Parte Comments of Mt. Hood Cable
Regulatory Commission (visited Sept. 12, 1999) <http:/www.mhcrc.orglCurrentlssues/
fccexpar.htm> [hereinafter MHCRC Comments]; accord FCC License Transfer,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, para. 75 & n.219, 15 Comm. Reg. (P
& F) 29 (citing to MHCRC Comments).
56. MHCRC Comments, supra note 55. The Denver City Council reached largely the
same conclusion in a resolution requisition action on cable Internet unbundling by the FCC.
"[T]he City has determined that the public interest is served by assuring that a wide diversity
of information sources are made available to the public from cable systems," and further,
"that there is significant potential for reduction of competition in Internet and on-line [sic]
services if the dominant cable operator does not provide nondiscriminatory access to its
cable modem platform." Resolution 9, Series of 1999, Urging the FCC to Take Swift Action
Regarding Internet Service Providers Access to Cable Networks (visited Aug. 24, 1999)
<http://www.denvergov.org/content/template13660.asp>. Denver was faced with a situation
similar to that of Portland, but chose not to require open access because "TCI and AT&T
represent that local franchise authorities such as the [c]ity of Denver are preempted by
federal law from regulating in the public interest with respect to open access to such cable
modem platforms." Id. They further noted that AT&T/TCI "have brought litigation against
other local franchise authorities that have attempted to regulate in the public interest." Id.
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ISPs have noted that AT&T and TCI's provision of Internet access
through @Home cuts consumer choice. Indeed, it seems unlikely that
customers would pay an additional charge for the service of AOL,
Mindspring, or local ISPs after already paying forty dollars per month or
more for a similar service from @Home.57 Thus, without equal access to
the cable, it is unlikely that any ISP can compete in the arena of cable
Internet access. Indeed, the FCC concedes that:
A pessimistic observer might predict that the limitations of some
broadband technologies will lead to a patchwork of local broadband
monopolies, with most new entrants remaining fringe players. In the
consumer market, in this view, DSL will be the only successful
technology in one neighborhood, cable-based broadband in the next
neighborhood, and satellites in rural areas. In addition, certain
commenters [sic] argue that if economies of scale and scope in
broadband for the consumer market are significant, the present
headstart of the cable companies will give them an insuperable first
mover advantage and leave them with the kind of dominance they still
enjoy in their core market for multichannel video program distribution
(MVPD). While this pessimistic view may include broadband reaching
all Americans, it does not foresee competition for most residential58
consumers.
Discrimination may also occur in terms of restrictions placed on
competitive ISPs. The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) warned
the FCC that Internet video streaming might be restricted to @Home.59
This conclusion is supported by TCI President and Chief Operating Officer
Leo J. Hindery, Jr.'s acknowledgement that streaming video limitations
had been placed on @Homer The NAB interpreted this as a sign that TCI
was willing to limit access to potentially competitive providers of content.
61
If such limitations are placed on competitors, it will likely drive consumers
to the cable company's own ISP.
3. Microsoft Analogy
In the absence of unbundling, the current and potential offerings of
cable Internet access bears many similarities to the tactics purportedly used
57. See Rochelle Garner, Cable Access Critical for AOL, MULTICHANNEI. NEWS, Nov.
30, 1998, at 20.
58. Deployment of Advanced Telecomms., Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, para. 47, 14
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1292 (1999).
59. See Ted Hearn, Rivals Demand Access to AT&T-TCI Networks, MuLTICHANNEL
Nws, Nov. 2, 1998, at 55.
60. See id. "Cable sources have said, however, that @Home's 10-minute cap on video
streaming was primarily designed to conserve bandwidth, and not to protect cable-
subscription revenue." Id.
61. See id.
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by Microsoft to unfairly attempt to gain dominance in the market for Web
browsers. In the complaint filed by the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, the government alleged that Microsoft "Misused...
its Windows operating system monopoly" by requiring PC Original
Equipment Manufacturers "to adopt the uniform 'boot-up' sequence and
'desktop' screen specified by Microsoft" to ensure the prominent
placement of Internet Explorer and prevent prominent placement of
Internet browsers of any of Microsoft's competitors.62 "[T]hese restrictions
ensure that users of Windows continue to see the Microsoft-specified
Windows desktop unless and until they take affirmative steps to change the
screens presented." 63 This conduct was argued to have resulted in the
exclusion of competitors "from the most important channels of
distribution," and to have allowed Microsoft "to use the near-ubiquity of its
Windows operating system monopoly to gain dominance in both the
Internet browser market and other software markets."' 64 Further, ISPs and
providers of Internet content are alleged to have agreed not to sell to
Internet Explorer's competitors in exchange for prominent desktop
placement.65 The clear implication of Microsoft's alleged conduct is that
the superior positioning on the desktop, which Microsoft's market position
allows it to control, gives it a clear edge because users are unlikely, or at
least much less likely, to switch to a competitor when Internet Explorer is
already available and prominently placed. Indeed, it is unlikely that the
ISPs and content providers would have forgone other sources of revenue
unless they felt that lost revenues would be outweighed by the benefits of
prominent placement on the Windows desktop.
There are striking similarities between these aspects of Microsoft's
alleged conduct and the position taken by cable companies with regard to
cable Internet access. While no single cable company has a monopoly, "[a]
cable system serving a local community, with rare exceptions, enjoys a
,,66
monopoly. In fact, as of Congress's consideration of the 1992 Cable Act,
sixty percent of U.S. television households subscribed to cable.67 The
National Cable Television Association (NCTA) reports that as of 1998 that
number had increased to about sixty-seven percent of U.S. television
62. Complaint at para. 24, United States v. Microsoft Corp., CIV.A.98-1232, 1998 WL
614485, (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998), available at <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/fl700/
1763.htm>.
63. Id. at para. 97.
64. Id. at para. 27.
65. See id. at paras. 75-92.
66. S. REP. No. 102-92, at 8 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1140-41.
67. See H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 30 (1992).
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households.6s By giving their own ISP prominent placement within the
cable system, rather than on the equal footing that could come from
unbundling or open access, cable companies can expect to experience the
same benefit in two-thirds of American television households that
Microsoft has experienced in its Windows market. Learning from the
history of Microsoft, it is clear that once two-way cable is in place, cable
companies will be able to leverage their subscriber base into likely
subscribers to their ISP. Users who were unwilling to go through the effort
of obtaining a competitor to Internet Explorer are expected to be similarly
unwilling to subscribe to additional content or Internet access when the
cable company's ISP is readily available. It is even less likely that Internet
users in these homes will take the steps necessary to obtain high-speed
Internet access through a competing technology.
4. Access to Local Content
The incentives of the cable industry, coupled with their superior
positioning, will lead to decreased choice and access to local content. As
the Senate noted when discussing the rate regulations in the Cable Act of
1992, "[w]hile there may be regulatory or structural approaches that might
better suit the problems, because these involve changing cable's mode of
operation, such approaches are impractical. The Committee is not writing
,9
on a blank slate." In the case of the Cable Act, this rang true as a result of,
in large part, the regulatory environment created by the government and the
resulting market consequences. The extensive regulations of broadcasters,
including spectrum assignments, statutory duty to serve the local
community, and the compulsory copyright license, coupled with the
70(de)regulatory approach taken in the 1984 Cable Act, led to a situation
whereby cable companies were able to profit at the expense of
broadcasters.7' The incentives for cable companies to give unfavorable
treatment to broadcasters increased as "competition for programming,
viewers, and advertising dollars increas[ed]. ' 72
The effects of the incentives before the cable industry are important
to remember when thinking about the future of commercial provision of
Internet access. The expectation for the future is that "'[n]ext-generation
68. See Cable Industry Facts-at-a-Glance 1998 (visited Sept. 1, 1999)
<http://www.ncta.com/yearend98_6.html> (based on Nielsen Media Research information).
69. S. REP. No. 102-92, at 18, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1150-51.
70. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984).
71. See Esbin, supra note 18, at 66; cf. H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 50-57 (discussing the
need for must-carry regulations).
72. H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 53.
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Internet is next-generation NBC, where we finally see the true convergence
of the computer and home entertainment,"' and "'[b]roadband, a la
@Home, gets us to that point.' 73 Many anticipate that the future of ISPs lie
in capturing revenues from advertising and proprietary content and
programming. 74 Indeed, the cable industry stated that primary services to be
provided by ISPs such as @Home or Road Runner "will be closer in nature
to traditional cable offerings, with significant operator-provided content
and browsing capability, than the Internet-based services provided by the
telephone carriers." 75 A good example is provided by Optimum Online, the
high-speed ISP for Cablevision in Connecticut. Optimum Online breaks the
Web into categories for subscribers, such as news, sports, community, etc.
76
It also includes "News 12 Interactive," an online counterpart to
Cablevision's regional cable news service and other resources such as
"SportsChannel," "Community Center" and "ExtraHelp Online. ' 77 In this
environment, the market will again involve "competition for programming,
viewers, and advertising dollars," this time among ISPs. 78 As these ISPs
recognize, it is unlikely that subscribers will want to pay even a reasonable
amount of money for content when they have already paid @Home for the
same thing.
a. Must-Carry Justifications
Many of the same justifications that motivated the must-carry
requirements in the 1992 Cable Act, mandating cable carriage of local
broadcast programming, apply to ISPs as well.79 The same technology
issues that led to broadcasting disadvantages hinder competing ISPs
relative to cable ISPs. 0 The same market incentives just discussed
(competition for programming, viewers, and advertising dollars) led to the
disadvantage of broadcasting relative to cable and are present with ISPs.
73. Garner, supra note 57, at 20 (quoting Alan Braverman, an analyst who covers AOL
for Deutsche Bank Securities in New York).
74. See id.
75. Esbin, supra note 18, at 77.
76. See id. at 79.
77. See id. at 79-80.
78. H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 53 (1992).
79. Indeed, the similarities between the type of regulation embodied in an open access
requirement for cable modem technology and the must-carry rules led AT&T/TCI to argue
that the must-carry rules were intended by Congress to preempt local regulation of a similar
nature. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138, 142 (D.
Or. June 3, 1999). The court quickly dismissed this argument. Since the open access
provisions only require access to the cable Internet technology, the requirements were not in
tension with must-carry. See id.
80. See supra Part IV.B.1-2.
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Further, the compulsory copyright license, a source of economic
disadvantage sometimes used as part of the justification for must-carry
requirements-which is not imposed upon ISPs-may in fact only be an
illusory disadvantage to broadcasters.1 Thus, in a world where the line
between Internet access and broadcasting is blurred, ISPs may face the
same technological and economic situation that faced broadcasters prior to
the implementation of must-carry requirements in the 1992 Cable Act.1
2
81. Although the burden of the compulsory copyright license is sometimes discussed as
part of the justification for must-carry requirements, it is not clear that Congress, through the
compulsory copyright license, took anything away from broadcasters that they ever really
had. Two Supreme Court cases established that there was no copyright liability for cable
retransmission of broadcast programming. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artist Television,
Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (holding that cable retransmission of local broadcast signals was
wholly outside the copyright laws); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcast System.
Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (holding that cable systems were not liable under copyright laws
for retransmitting either distant or imported signals). It was not until 1976 that Congress
amended the Copyright Act and established a licensing system for cable retransmission,
arguably to further both the goals of broad public dissemination of broadcast programs and
the protection of the rights of copyright holders. See Nicholas W. Allard, The 1992 Cable
Act: Just the Beginning, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 305, 336 (1993). "The thrust of
the new licensing scheme, called compulsory licensing, was to guarantee cable operators the
right to conduct their business free from the threat of liability as long as they complied with
FCC regulations and paid their proper royalties." Id. Under pre-1976 copyright
jurisprudence, broadcasters would have been entitled to nothing in return for cable
retransmission of their programming. Due to the 1976 amendments, cable companies must
pay licensing fees. Compulsory copyright licensing, thus, actually worked to give new
benefits to broadcasters vis-A-vis cable.
82. Broadcasters' statutory duty to serve the local community could be seen as another
distinction between the circumstances faced by broadcasters, for which must-carry
requirements were justified, and the current situation of local ISPs. Cf. Turner Brdcst. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 676-77 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that a preference for local content motivated the must-carry requirements,
despite the insistence of the majority that the requirements are content-neutral). Despite the
absence of any statutory duty, local ISPs may serve the public interest of their local
community in the same way as broadcasters. Indeed, one reason for Portland's rejection of
TCI's franchise transfer absent open access was to "smooth the way for.., local ISPs to
offer Internet access that addresses specific community needs." Colman, supra note 25, at
67.
At the very least, anecdotal evidence indicates that local ISPs provide many of the
same types of news, information, and services of interest to the local community they serve
as do broadcasters. See, e.g., Pointonline.net (visited Aug. 28, 1999) <http://www.
pointonline.net> (ISP serving central Wisconsin); MagicNet (visited Aug. 28, 1999)
<http://www.magiclink.com> (ISP serving Idaho); InterNet Labs (visited Aug. 28, 1999)
<http://netlabs.netloldhome.html> (ISP serving central New Jersey); Lone Keep Internet
(visited Aug. 28, 1999) <http://www.lonekeep.com> (ISP serving Jersey Shore, New
Jersey); Cyberlink Internet Access (visited Aug. 28, 1999) <http://www.clnk.com> (ISP
serving Southeast Oklahoma); North Country Internet Access (visited Aug. 28, 1999)
<http://www.ncia.net> (ISP serving New Hampshire and Northern New England); Cyber
City Maui (visited Aug. 28, 1999) <http://www.ccmaui.com> (ISP serving Maui, Hawaii).
These ISPs feature links to local news, weather, current community events, and other
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b. Leased Access Justifications
While the must-carry policy justifications apply to a great extent in
the context of cable Internet access for ISPs, the justifications for leased
access requirements apply with even greater force. A requirement that
channels be set aside for third-party commercial access separates editorial
control over a limited number of cable channels from the ownership of the
cable system itself. Such a requirement is fundamental to the goal of
providing subscribers with the diversity of information sources intended by
the First Amendment.83 The offering of Internet access through @Home by
AT&T and TCI provides insight into how this goal could be frustrated in
the Internet context. TCI is one of the owners and original developers of
@Home. Thus, the content they provide would be under the same editorial
control as the rest of the programming offered by TCI. Indeed, because
@Home and Road Runner are the cable ISPs of choice for such a large and
geographically diverse audience, there will be an incentive to "dumb
down" the content they provide to the least offensive level nationally to
avoid the need to generate different content for particular local markets.
Competing ISPs, if allowed access to the cable modem platform, would
provide a different editorial voice. This voice would be expected to be
more attuned to local interests and controversies, rather than attempting to
sell to a national audience. Further, unlike must-carry, leased access
provisions were not justified on the basis of statutory content requirements
or the preservation of an established regulatory scheme. The public policy
information. Many of these ISPs also host web pages for subscribers and feature advertising
from local businesses. Others also offer discussion forums focused on topics of relevance to
the communities served. These sites are freely accessible through general Internet access.
Thus, one need not be a subscriber to receive the content available on these sites. However,
if ISPs follow an @Home-type model-providing content to subscribers as part of the
service fee-then many of the services provided by these pages would be accessible only by
subscribers. Further, if the local ISPs hosting these sites are unable to stay in business, the
content, which is clearly locally focused, will be lost.
When coupled with the likely convergence of television and Internet content, it is clear
that the need to preserve the content provided by local ISPs rivals the need to preserve the
content statutorily required of broadcasters. Thus, any justifications used in support of
existing must-carry requirements also apply to local ISPs. The explicit recognition that
preference for local content motivated the regulation, however, seems likely to bring it
under strict scrutiny for First Amendment purposes, which will likely result in the regulation
being struck down.
83. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 30 (1984); 47 U.S.C. § 532(a) (1994) (stating that the
purpose of the leased access provision is "to promote competition in the delivery of diverse
sources of video programming and to assure that the widest possible diversity of
information sources are made available to the public from cable systems in a manner
consistent with growth and development of cable systems"). In addition, the Court advanced
this purpose as one of its primary justifications for the must-carry requirements. See Turner
Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).
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justifications that make open access of cable to ISPs analogous to must-
carry requirements apply with even greater force to leased access
requirements.
The bare existence of a provision requiring access to the cable
Internet technology for ISPs, however, is not enough. The franchise
transfer agreements of both Portland and Multnomah County wisely
required such access to be "nondiscriminatory." 4 Indeed, Congress noted
that despite the inclusion of a leased access provision in the 1984 Cable
Act, fewer commercial programming providers have availed themselves of
the access than had been envisioned. "[T]he principal reason for this
deficiency is that the Cable Act empowered cable operators to establish the
price and conditions for use of leased access channels. '5 Consequently, in
the 1992 Cable Act, the FCC was authorized to set terms and prices for
86
such agreements. Similarly, it is necessary for reasonable limits to beplaced on an open access provision for cable Internet access.
C. Legal Challenges to Open Access Remedies
If the cable access issue is a problem, some remedy must be created
as a solution. Several potential alternatives can be drawn from existing
communications law. For example, must-carry requirements similar to
those requiring cable carriage of broadcast programming could be used.
Similarly, an approach like leased access could be used to open up the
cable modem platform. However, any approach taken will likely face
several constitutional challenges.
1. First Amendment Challenges
Access to the cable Internet technology for all ISPs is clearly in the
public interest both in terms of procompetitive policy and encouragement
of diverse sources of content, particularly content geared toward the local
and community interests. Congress has recognized the legitimacy of these
goals through such regulations as must-carry and leased access. Potential
means of advancing these goals must then be found. One alternative would
be a must-carry requirement mandating carriage of some number of ISPs
similar to that for broadcasters. Must-carry provisions as currently
embodied in the Communications Act have been upheld as constitutional
84. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138, 139 (D. Or.
June 3, 1999) (quoting identical provisions in Portland, Or., Ordinance 172955 (Dec. 17,
1998) and Mutlnomah County Bd. of Comm'rs, Or., Resolution 98-208 (Dec. 17, 1998)).
85. H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 39 (1992).
86. See id. at 40.
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under the First Amendment in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC. 
7
The analysis in Turner makes it questionable, however, whether any must-
carry requirements regarding ISPs would be constitutional.
The first time the Turner case reached the Supreme Court, the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the FCC was reversed. The
Court applied the intermediate First Amendment standard established in
United States v. O'Brien,9 and determined that there were genuine issues
of material fact regarding the actual jeopardy faced by broadcasters and the
expected impact of the must-carry regulations." On appeal after remand,
the Court applied O'Brien to the expanded record.9 This time, the Court
upheld the must-carry regulations, noting that "[t]he expanded record now
permits us to consider whether the must-carry provisions were designed to
address a real harm, and whether those provisions will alleviate it in a
material way. 92 At the present time, it is unclear whether there is enough
evidence of current harm for a legislature to reference in order to overcome
First Amendment challenges.
The MHCRC, in a filing with the FCC, correctly observed:
[E]ither action is pursued now, or else an overly timid 'wait and see'
attitude (whether federal or local), will require all involved levels of
government to spend many years in the future trying to 'retrofit' open
access onto a monopolistic and proprietary broadband Internet
platform: the same platform the cable industry is now rushing to
deploy. 93
Thus, options other than must-carry should be considered to remedy the
potential problem. The MHCRC felt that "the critical need to ensure that a
maximum variety of choices concerning high-speed access to the Internet
be available to users and citizens of any income level or social status"
justified an open access requirement, which is similar to an unbundling or a
leased access provision.94 Variations on unbundling or leased access could
87. See Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. 622, 661 (1994); Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc.,
520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997). Several previous attempts at must-carry regulations were
unconstitutional. See Century Comm., Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304 (D.C. Cir.),
clarified, 837 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1032 (1988) (holding that
must-carry regulations failed First Amendment analysis for adequate justification); Quincy
Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169
(1986).
88. See Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 668.
89. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
90. See Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 667-68.
91. See Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. at 189.
92. Id. at 195.
93. MHCRC Comments, supra note 55.
94. Id. The precise language of the open access requirement was spelled out in the
Portland and Multnomah County franchise transfer requirements: "Transferee [i.e., AT&T]
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also potentially be used to address the problem.95
Similar regulations have also faced First Amendment challenge. This
type of "structural" regulation, aimed at encouraging diversity in
information and to reduce the threat of bottlenecks, has often been upheld.
96In Associated Press v. United States, the Court upheld the application of
the Sherman Antitrust Act against newspaper combinations. 97 The Court
stated that the First Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public." 98 Such regulations have
been upheld since then.99 The district court in AT&T Corp. v. City of
Portlandl'o held that there was, in fact, no First Amendment violation.' '
The court argued that since no carriage of particular speech is required and
no threat of the public mistaking the content of other ISPs for that of
@Home exists, there is no free speech violation.'0 Further, the court
concluded that even if the First Amendment right of AT&T and TCI were
implicated, the open access approach of Portland and Multnomah County
would pass O'Brien's reasonableness test.
shall provide, and cause the Franchisees to provide, non-discriminatory [sic] access to the
Franchisees' cable modem platform for providers of Internet and on-line [sic] services,
whether or not such providers are affiliated with Transferee or the Franchisees, unless
otherwise required by applicable law." AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138, 139 (D. Or. June 3, 1999) (quoting provisions in Portland, Or.,
Ordinance 172955 (Dec. 17, 1998) and Mutlnomah County Bd. of Comm'rs, Or.,
Resolution 98-208 (Dec. 17, 1998)).
95. See FCC License Transfer, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160,
para. 86, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 29 (1999).
96. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
97. See id. at 23.
98. Id. at 20.
99. See CBS, Inc., v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396-97 (1981) (upholding requirement that
affords candidates for elective office "reasonable" access to broadcasting time); FCC v.
National Citizens Comm. for Brdcst, 436 U.S. 775, 814-15 (1978) (upholding the FCC's
newspaper-broadcast, cross-ownership rules); see also Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (concluding that "assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity
of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes
values central to the First Amendment").
100. Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P &F) 138 (D. Or. June 3, 1999).
101. See id. at 142.
102. See id. This same argument was used by the Oregon district court to reject
AT&T/TCI's argument that the open access terms conflicted with 47 U.S.C. § 544(f)(1). See
id. This subsection states that local authorities may not "impose requirements regarding the
provision or content of cable services." 47 U.S.C. § 544(f)(1) (1994). Thus, the conclusion
that the First Amendment rights of AT&T/TCI are not violated because carriage of specific
content is not required also serves to invalidate the claim under section 544(f)(1).
103. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138.
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2. Other Constitutional Challenges
The Oregon District Court also quickly disposed of several other
claims raised by AT&T and TCI under the U.S. Constitution. The
regulation did not unduly burden interstate commerce in violation of the
Commerce Clause,'14 despite arguments by AT&T and TCI that the
technological changes necessary to implement open access would impose
extra expenses. Evidence was presented that competing ISPs would
provide the needed hardware for connections. Further, local procedures
exist for resolving specific franchise agreement disputes. Thus, AT&T and
TCI would be afforded several levels of review regarding any specific issue
associated with open access implementation.'0 5
The provision also did not substantially impair private contracts in
violation of the Contract Clause.O' The court held that, contrary to AT&T
and TCI's claims, the open access provisions "relate[] to AT&T's legal
qualifications to assume control of TCI's cable franchises."' 0 7 Thus, the
provision is consistent with the franchise agreement and results in no
impairment of the contractual rights of AT&T and TCI that would violate
the Contracts Clause.1°8
3. Preemption
Federal preemption of a local law can occur through field preemption,
express preemption, or conflict preemption. '9 In the case of field
preemption, the federal government has occupied an entire subject area,
and local authorities cannot supplement federal regulations." Express
preemption occurs when a federal law states in the statute itself Congress's
intent to supplant state regulation."' Finally, conflict preemption occurs
when it is impossible to follow both a federal and a state regulation," 2 or
when joint compliance is possible but the goals underlying the regulations
are inconsistent.13 The ultimate issue under any theory of federal
preemption is that of congressional intent.1
4
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
105. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138, 142-
43.
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
107. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138, 143.
108. See id.
109. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
110. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
111. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516.
112. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
113. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
114. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 132.
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The district court in AT&T Corp. correctly found that the local
ordinances were not preempted." 5 Field preemption does not exist because
Congress specifically recognized the need for regulation other than on the
federal level. For example, 47 U.S.C. § 533(d)(2) provides specifically for
"state or franchising authority" regulation for purposes of promoting
... 116
competition. Similarly, section 706 calls for action by the states to
encourage the rapid deployment of advanced telecommunications
technologies." 7 These provisions will be discussed in greater detail in the
discussion of the authority for Portland and Multnomah County to require
118
open access.
This same statutory language indicates that Congress did not
expressly preempt local open access regulations. Cable Internet access is
not specifically mentioned in the Communications Act, whereas in the
consideration of field preemption and discussed in great detail in the next
section, congressional recognition of a continued role for state and local
authorities is embodied in the Act itself.
Finally, the actions of Portland and Multnomah County are consistent
with the intent of Congress. Again, the examples of 47 U.S.C. § 533(d)(2)
and section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 indicate
congressional goals of protection of competition and of expediting access
to technologies such as the Internet. To the extent that these were also the
goals of Portland and Multnomah County, the open access provision was
consistent with congressional intent.
4. Challenges to the Pricing Scheme
The open access or unbundling alternatives would require some
payment to the owner of the broadband infrastructure. AT&T and TCI
expressed concern that any such payment would be insufficient to
compensate it not only for the marginal cost of providing the bandwidth,
but also for investment in technology and risk bearing. This could, AT&T
and TCI submit, "delay and diminish its deployment of broadband services
to residential customers."' 19 The NCTA has made the same argument,
suggesting that "'exclusive bundling' by @Home is needed to reduce risk
and provide adequate revenue streams to support investment in broadband
115. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138, 142 (D.
Or. June 3, 1999).
116. 47 U.S.C. § 533(d)(2) (1994).
117. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 sec. 706.
118. See infra Part V.
119. FCC License Transfer, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, para.
89, 15 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 29 (1999).
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cable upgrades."'' 20 However, others have argued that providing access to
other ISPs would produce additional revenue as existing subscribers of
these ISPs switch to the faster broadband access, for which AT&T and TCI
will receive compensation from the ISP.'2' While this may well be the case
for larger ISPs, it is unclear how much additional revenue will be provided
by smaller, local ISPs. Indeed, the incumbent local-exchange carriers
challenged the mechanism used to determine pricing of elements that were
unbundled as required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The
opinions in that case, however, provide no guidance as to the
appropriateness of that method. Thus, the ultimate acceptability of any• • 123
particular pricing method remains for future consideration.
V. LOCAL REGULATIONS
It has been shown that the open access provisions required by
Portland and Multnomah County were justified on policy grounds. Thus,
what remains to be considered-and what is at the heart of the lawsuit-is
the appropriateness of local, rather than federal, implementation of this
policy.
Initially, the regulation and franchising of cable companies was solely
a state matter. A series of Supreme Court and District of Columbia Circuit
decisions, however, paved the way for substantial federal regulation of
cable and the franchising process. 24 Beginning with the 1984 Cable Act,
this authority was codified with the intent of establishing standards and
procedures for the issuance and renewal of franchises.12 Thus, to determine
120. Id. at para. 90.
121. See id. at para. 91.
122. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 728 n.3 (1999) ("Incumbents
argued below that [the pricing] method was unreasonable because it stranded their historic
costs and underestimated the actual costs of providing interconnection and unbundled
access. The Eighth Circuit did not reach this issue, and the merits of [this pricing method]
are not before us.").
123. This includes not only constitutional validity, but acceptability in terms of the
market impact of the pricing scheme.
124. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 365-66 (D.C. Cir.
1963) (upholding the FCC's denial of a microwave common carrier's license because the
carrier's customer was a cable company that intended to import distant television to compete
with local broadcast stations); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178
(1968) (finding FCC jurisdiction over all cable matters "reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting"); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 667 (1972)
(interpreting Southwestern Cable as establishing "authority to regulate CATV with a view
not merely to protect but to promote the objectives for which the Commission had been
assigned jurisdiction over broadcasting").
125. See 47 U.S.C. § 521(2), (5) (1994).
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whether the local governments in Portland and Multnomah County had
authority to impose the open access condition on the franchise transfer it is
necessary to look to federal law.
First, it is important to note that the open access regulation does not
regulate AT&T and TCI as a common carrier in violation of 47 U.S.C. §
541(c). 126 The district court recognized that because the requirements
applied only to access by competing ISPs, the restrictions did not require
AT&T and TCI "'to hold out facilities indifferently for public use and thus
[did] not compel cable operators to function as common carriers."" 27 Thus,
the open access provisions are correctly seen as regulations of cable
services.
Generally, cable services cannot be offered without a local
franchise. 2 Consequently, as long as Internet access and content, such as
that provided by @Home, is deemed a cable service, a franchise is required
for its provision. The ability of franchising authorities to regulate
franchisees is limited to the areas provided for by the Communications Act
itself. 29 However, the Act provides several grants of regulatory authority to
state and local bodies.
A. Authority to Implement Procompetitive Regulations
The most direct expression of authority, relied on in part by the
MHCRC to justify local open access requirements, comes in 47 U.S.C. §
533(d), which addresses regulation of franchise ownership by franchising
authorities. It states that, although franchising authorities may not deny
ownership or control of a cable system because of a person's ownership or
control of any other media interest:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State or
franchising authority from prohibiting the ownership or control of a
cable system in a jurisdiction by any person ... (2) in circumstances in
which the State or franchising authority determines that the acquisition
of such a cable system may eliminate or reduce competition in the
delivery of cable service in such jurisdiction.130
This section shows a clear "authoriz[ation of] local authorities to
126. This section states that cable systems "shall not be subject to regulation as a
common carrier or utility by reason of providing any cable service." 47 U.S.C. § 541(c)
(1994).
127. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138, 141 (D. Or.
June 3, 1999) (quoting Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. at 707 n.16).
128. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (1994).
129. See 47 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994) ("Any franchising authority may not regulate the
services, facilities, and equipment provided by a cable operator except to the extent
consistent with this subchapter.").
130. 47 U.S.C. § 533(d) (1994).
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impose pro-competitive [sic] conditions."' 3 The potential anticompetitive
impact of cable Internet access absent an unbundling or open access
provision has been vigorously discussed before the FCC. 132 Even though
the FCC did not find these arguments sufficiently persuasive to warrant
action on its part, the Oregon District Court recognized that "[s]o long as
the City and the County act within their jurisdiction, their findings
[regarding competition] are entitled to deference."'
13
B. Authority Under Section 706
In addition, section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
validates this exercise of authority. Part of the concern that led the
MHCRC to suggest the open access requirement was a concern that cable
Internet access would be the only viable means of obtaining high-speed
Internet access for substantial groups of people.'3 The MHCRC felt that
the open access requirement would help maximize the number of people
with high-speed access and avoid an "'information-rich' vs. 'information-
poor' society.' 35 Section 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act states,
in pertinent part:
The [FCC] and each State commission with regulatory
jurisdiction over telecommunications services shall encourage the
deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in
particular, elementary and secondary schools and classrooms) by
utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience,
and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures
that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or
other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure
investment. 136
The actions of Portland and Multnomah County to ensure widespread
access to high-speed Internet capabilities and to ensure competition within
this market are entirely consistent with the desire of this section.
The applicability of section 706 is not diminished by the fact that the
Portland City Council and Multnomah County Board of Commissioners
are not "state" commissions and were not exercising jurisdiction over
"telecommunications services" in a literal sense. The inclusion of "State
commission" within the policy directive clearly indicates the intent of
131. MHCRC Comments, supra note 55.
132. See supra Part IV.B.
133. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, Opinion, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 138, 141 (D. Or.
June 3, 1999).
134. See MHCRC Comments, supra note 55.
135. Id.
136. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 sec. 706.
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Congress that the policy be implemented at both the federal and state
levels. In the case of cable Internet access-a service that would be an
advanced telecommunications service under the authority of a
telecommunications commission were it not implemented through cable
lines-the local commissions exercise the regulatory authority. The
reasonable interpretation of section 706 is one that not only authorizes, but
specifically calls for the type of action pursued by Portland and Multnomah
County.
C. Authority to Regulate in Public Interest
Justifications for the must-carry requirements imposed for carriage of
broadcasting signals seemed to apply with similar force to the content and
services provided by competing ISPs. This similarity can be expected to
increase as the line between the Internet and television continues to blur.
The franchises issued by Portland and Multnomah County allow the
imposition of "appropriate public interest conditions related to AT&T's
legal, financial, and technical abilities. 137 The MHCRC argues that this
further justifies the open access requirement." However, the
Telecommunications Act provides that, with certain exceptions, "any
provision of any franchise granted by [a franchising] authority, which is
inconsistent with this chapter shall be deemed to be preempted and
superseded."'3 9 Thus, the public interest condition within the franchise
itself must be consistent with the Act if it is to be enforced.
From its very start, the Telecommunications Act evidences an intent
that "franchise procedures ... assure that cable systems are responsive to
the needs and interests of the local community."' 4 This statement alone
should provide adequate evidence that the franchise agreement is
consistent with the Act. The renewal procedure to be followed by
franchising authorities further supports the open access requirement
imposed by Portland and Multnomah County. When considering the
proposal for franchise renewal of a cable operator, the franchising authority
may consider whether "the operator's proposal is reasonable to meet the
future cable-related community needs and interests, taking into account the
cost of meeting such needs and interests.' 41 The "community needs and
interests" would seem to reasonably include the benefits the community
receives from the local news, information, community services, and other
137. MHCRC Comments, supra note 55.
138. See id.
139. 47 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1994).
140. 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (1994) (statement of purposes).
141. 47 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1)(D) (1994).
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content offered by competing ISPs, particularly local ISPs.
Each of these three justifications-procompetition, public interest,
and section 706-independently justifies the open access provisions in the
franchise transfer. When the arguments in support of regulatory power are
considered together, they clearly provide adequate federal authority for
local action.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the heated debate on the need for unbundling that has
occurred at the federal level, local authorities have taken the lead in
requiring open access to cable for competing ISPs. General anticompetitive
concerns with cable Internet dominated by the cable company could be
alleviated in large part by requiring open access to cable for ISPs. Such a
requirement would also further the public interest in a manner similar to
the must-carry and leased access requirements in the broadcasting context.
Finally, federal law seems to permit local authorities to require open access
for local ISPs. Such authority is based on the ability to further
procompetitive goals, to provide high-speed Internet access in a timely
manner, and to support the public interests and the interests of the
community.
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